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The Shifting Definition: The Clean Water Act, “Waters of
the United States,” and the Impact on Agriculture
I. Introduction
“Farming looks mighty easy when your plow is a pencil, and you’re a
thousand miles from the corn field.”1 Agriculture has never been an easy
way of life, particularly when water is the lifeblood that decides whether
crops grow or animals have nutrients to survive. Besides nature’s fickle
rains, agriculturalists also battle the added struggles of complying with
environmental and conservation rules and regulations. From hydrating
yards, to cleaning toxic spills, to providing a safe habitat for animals, water
is a flexible, fluid, and fascinating compound. Indeed, as the famed natural
science writer and philosopher Loren Eiseley commented, “If there is magic
on this planet, it is contained in water.”2 Because of water’s importance,
there needs to be some form of government intervention to protect this
resource while still allowing water to be utilized efficiently.
In the United States, the most important water and environmental
protection laws were passed in the mid-twentieth century, beginning with
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948.3 The passage of the Clean
Water Act of 19774 (CWA) and the Water Quality Act of 19875 overhauled
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Both the CWA as originally
enacted and the Water Quality Act of 1987 help form what is now
commonly called the CWA as a whole.6 The purpose of the CWA is “to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters.”7 In the initial reading of this statement, it appears to be a
simple and readily achievable objective; however, the definition of some
terms (and the cross-definition of others) creates a confusing landscape.
The CWA first notes that the waters eligible for protection are “navigable
waters,”8 which the CWA defines as “the waters of the United States,
1. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address at Bradley University, Peoria, Illinois
(Sept. 25, 1956), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/233210.
2. LOREN C. EISELEY, THE IMMENSE JOURNEY 15 (1957).
3. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 845, 62 Stat. 1155; see
also History of the Clean Water Act, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.
gov/laws-regulations/history-clean-water-act (last visited Sept. 2, 2020).
4. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566.
5. Pub. L. No. 1004, 101 Stat. 7.
6. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 (2018).
7. Id. § 1251(a).
8. Id. § 1251(a)(1).
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including territorial seas.”9 The remainder of the CWA is silent as to what
exactly fits within the definition of “the waters of the United States” or
WOTUS.
In the early to mid-2000s, the Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari to hear two cases—Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers10 and Rapanos v. United
States11—that would have a profound impact on the interpretation and
definition of WOTUS. These cases helped set the significant groundwork
for how the Court thought of WOTUS, navigable waters, and whether the
federal government had jurisdiction to regulate those waters. While the
cases provided some guidance, uncertainty remained.
To help alleviate some of the confusion, the Army Corps of Engineers
and the EPA each created documents that explained their joint
interpretations of the Court’s rulings regarding WOTUS.12 The EPA, under
President Obama’s administration, promulgated a clarification in 2015
aimed at defining “waters of the United States.”13 To make matters even
more complicated, President Trump’s administration then issued a final rule
that repealed the 2015 Rule.14 This recodification of the pre-2015 definition
pushed the CWA and WOTUS back into a regulatory scheme mostly
created in the late 1980s,15 with modifications made by the Supreme Court
along the way.16
9. Id. § 1362(7).
10. 529 U.S. 1129 (2000) (mem.).
11. 546 U.S. 932 (2005) (mem.).
12. See Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory
Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 app. (Jan. 15, 2003);
Memorandum from Benjamin H. Grumbles, Assistant Adm’r for Water, U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, and John Paul Woodley, Jr., Assistant Sec’y of the Army, Dep’t of the Army, Clean
Water Act Jurisdiction Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Rapanos v. United
States & Carabell v. United States (Dec. 2, 2008).
13. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054
(June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117,
120, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401) [hereinafter Clean Water Rule].
14. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules,
84 Fed. Reg. 56,626 (Oct. 22, 2019) (“The agencies are taking this final action to repeal the
Clean Water Rule: Definition of ‘Waters of the United States,’ 80 FR 37054 (June 29, 2015),
and to recodify the regulatory definitions of ‘waters of the United States’ that existed prior to
the August 28, 2015 effective date of the 2015 Rule.”).
15. See, e.g., Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed.
Reg. 41,206, 41,210 (Nov. 13, 1986) (moving the regulatory definitions of “waters of the
United States” and related terms to a separate section of the C.F.R. in order to provide
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On April 21, 2020, the EPA and the Department of the Army published
the Navigable Waters Protection Rule (NWPR) to further clarify how
waters of the United States are federally regulated.17 Now codified in the
Federal Register, this new definition provides four categories of waters of
the United States: “[1] [t]he territorial seas and traditional navigable waters;
[2] perennial and intermittent tributaries that contribute surface water flow
to such waters; [3] certain lakes, ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional
waters; and [4] wetlands adjacent to other jurisdictional waters.”18 This
Comment will examine the Navigable Waters Protection Rule and how its
changes will affect agriculture across the country.
The purpose of this Comment is to both provide a helpful guide on the
history of the legal and administrative procedures of the CWA and
WOTUS, and to interpret the current regulations and caselaw on the
jurisdictional requirements of WOTUS. This Comment will follow the
history of the CWA, followed by policy changes, relevant caselaw, and then
an in-depth look at the NWPR and its application to waters. First, Part II
sets the stage by explaining the codified language of the CWA that is
relevant to categorizing WOTUS and defining the terms. Part III details the
history of WOTUS, focusing on recent administrations’ changes beginning
in 2015 with President Obama’s changes to WOTUS and moving forward
to President Trump’s most recent announcement and reversion to previous
rules. Part IV provides background and explanation of selected WOTUS
caselaw. Part V examines the Navigable Waters Protection Rule in detail,
noting the differences between the 2019 Rule—which repealed President
Obama’s 2015 Rule—and the NWPR. Part VI explains how the NWPR will
affect the water permitting process for agriculturists. Lastly, Part VII
examines current litigation over the NWPR.

greater clarification of federal agency jurisdiction); see also Clean Water Act Section 404
Program Definitions and Permit Exemptions; Section 404 State Program Regulations, 53
Fed. Reg. 20,764, 20,765 (June 6, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 232, 233) (adding
further language to the regulatory definition of “waters of the United States” to clarify what
it encompasses).
16. See infra Part IV.
17. The Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,”
85 Fed. Reg. 22,250 (Apr. 21, 2020) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts.
110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401) [hereinafter Navigable Waters
Protection Rule].
18. Id. at 22,251. Jurisdictional waters are waters that fall under the jurisdiction of the
CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 (2018).
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II. Clean Water Act Sections 402 and 404
Specific to agriculture, sections 40219 and 40420 of the Clean Water Act
cause the greatest number of issues for pinpointing an exact determination
of permitting requirements. These sections are important for agriculture as
their additional permitting requirements are triggered if agriculturalists
produce a pollutant that is discharged into a federally regulated water.21
Those concerned with the integrity of our nation’s water supply call for
greater permitting requirements for agriculture due to the impact of farming
and ranch activities on these waters.22
Section 402, titled “National pollutant discharge elimination system,”
allows for the permit of a discharge of “any pollutant, or combination of
pollutants.”23 The difficulty surrounding this permitting is determining what
exactly qualifies as a: (1) point source; (2) discharge; (3) pollutant; and (4)
navigable waters.24 Section 502 provides the black-letter definition for these
terms. A point source is defined as “any discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance” of a pollutant.25 Pollutant “means dredged spoil, solid waste,
incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical
wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or
discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and
agricultural waste” that have been “discharged into water.”26 A discharge is
“any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”27
Finally, navigable waters are “the waters of the United States, including the
territorial seas.”28
Section 404, titled “Permits for dredged or fill material,” authorizes the
Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers, to “issue
permits . . . for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable
waters at specified disposal sites.”29 This section of the CWA also allows
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2018).
20. Id. § 1344.
21. Id. §§ 1342, 1344.
22. See Jan G. Laitos & Heidi Ruckriegle, The Clean Water Act and the Challenge of
Agricultural Pollution, 37 VT. L. REV. 1033, 1036 (2013) (“If agricultural pollution is
largely unregulated, then the nation’s waters will continue to be impaired.”).
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1).
24. See, e.g., id. § 1342(a)(1), (a)(4), (f).
25. Id. § 1362(14).
26. Id. § 1362(6).
27. Id. § 1362(12).
28. Id. § 1362(7).
29. Id. § 1344(a), (d).
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the Administrator of the EPA to work alongside the Army Secretary in
issuing these permits.30 However, the CWA takes agricultural interests into
account by defining a point source as “not includ[ing] agricultural
stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.”31
While these definitions may appear straightforward on paper, applying
them in practice is no simple task. Many grassroots advocacy groups and
trade associations demanded a clear system that could identify whether the
features of the land they were attempting to alter would require a national
pollutant discharge elimination system (NPDES) permit.32 Instead of
arguing over intricacies and nuances of the land on a case-by-case basis,
these groups strongly suggested that there should be a broad and easy-tointerpret set of rules.33
III. Administrative and Executive Procedures
A. 2015 Rule – President Obama
In 2015, the EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers promulgated
the Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States.”34 The
goal of this clarification was to expand the EPA’s jurisdiction under the
CWA to “reach[] beyond waters that are navigable in fact.”35 This final rule
redefined several terms to determine the jurisdictional bounds of WOTUS
under the CWA.36 As before, traditional navigable waters remained under
the authority of the CWA.37 However, the 2015 Rule modified the
regulatory enforcement of the CWA to include more “bright-line
boundaries . . . and limit the need for case-specific analysis” to determine
whether a water fell under federal jurisdiction.38

30. Id. § 1344(b), (c).
31. Id. § 1362(14).
32. See Chris Clayton, New Clean Water Rule Released, PROGRESSIVE FARMER (Jan. 23,
2020, 2:28 PM CST), https://www.dtnpf.com/agriculture/web/AG/news/world-policy/article/
2020/01/23/ag-groups-praise-trump-waters-us.
33. See id. (reporting that American Farm Bureau Federation president Zippy Duval
praised the NWPR because it “provides clarity and certainty”).
34. 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40
C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401).
35. Id. at 37,055.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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Under the 2015 Rule, tributaries were redefined “as waters that are
characterized by the presence of physical indicators of flow—bed and
banks and ordinary high water mark—and that contribute flow directly or
indirectly to a traditional navigable water, an interstate water, or the
territorial seas.”39 This definition relied heavily on the “physical indicators”
of these waters and whether their flow could move materials to waters
further downstream.40 The rule continued to require permitting for ditches
where “science clearly demonstrate[d] [the ditches] [we]re functioning as a
tributary.”41 The 2015 Rule noted that tributaries under the authority of the
permitting system of the CWA had to be waters that “affect[ed] the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of downstream waters.”42
Finally, the 2015 Rule used Justice Kenney’s “significant nexus” standard
as articulated in Rapanos v. United States for the basis of many WOTUS
determinations.43
Adjacent waters under the jurisdictional authority of the CWA permitting
regime had to “have a significant nexus to traditional navigable waters,
interstate waters, and the territorial seas based upon their hydrological and
ecological connections to, and interactions with, those waters.”44 The final
rule then defined adjacent to mean “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring”
other waters of the United States.45 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and
the EPA further clarified three instances where such neighboring waters
became part of the waters of the United States system.46 Like the tributaries
defined earlier, these adjacent waters are jurisdictional under the CWA.47
39. Id. at 37,058.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 37,059; see also 547 U.S. 715, 759 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring). For
further discussion of Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test, see infra Section IV.C.
44. Clean Water Rule, supra note 13, at 37,058.
45. Id.
46. Id. (stating these three circumstances) (“(1) Waters located in whole or in part
within 100 feet of the ordinary high water mark of a traditional navigable water, interstate
water, the territorial seas, an impoundment of a jurisdictional water, or a tributary, as defined
in the rule. (2) Waters located in whole or in part in the 100-year floodplain and that are
within 1,500 feet of the ordinary high water mark of a traditional navigable water, interstate
water, the territorial seas, an impoundment, or a tributary, as defined in the rule (‘floodplain
waters’). (3) Waters located in whole or in part within 1,500 feet of the high tide line of a
traditional navigable water or the territorial seas and waters located within 1,500 feet of the
ordinary high water mark of the Great Lakes.”).
47. Id.
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As a result, they must have a clear “hydrological and ecological
connection” with the waters of the United States to which they are
adjacent.48
Lastly, the 2015 Rule encouraged interpretation of the significant nexus
standard on a case-by-case analysis based on relevant scientific and legal
evidence.49 The 2015 Rule acknowledged five types of waters subject to
this significant nexus analysis: “[1] Prairie potholes; [2] Carolina and
Delmarva bays; [3] pocosins; [4] western vernal pools in California; and [5]
Texas coastal prairie wetlands.”50 As noted in the names of these types of
waters, they were often limited to a specific geographic area. To determine
whether these specific types of waters fell under the jurisdictional bounds
of the NPDES (and the CWA), the entire watershed system is to be
considered as a group.51 The whole group should include both the specific
water system being examined, as well as the “nearest traditional navigable
water, interstate water, or the territorial seas.”52
As a whole, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the EPA wanted to
create a final rule that provided greater clarity for determining the
jurisdictional limits of 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 while incorporating a
greater reliance on science and continuing to protect the waters of the
United States.53 Environmental groups praised the 2015 Rule, but industry
groups and some trade associations were outraged as they claimed vast
overreach by the federal government.54 The agricultural industry, headed by
the American Farm Bureau Federation, led the charge against the final rule,
with help from mining and manufacturing industries.55 What ensued was a
mass of litigation in various district courts across the nation.56 Some of the
48. Id.
49. Id. at 37,058–59.
50. Id. at 37,059.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 37,055.
54. See Rebecca Lessner, Environmentalists Praise New Clean Water Rules; Farmers
Upset, MARYLANDREPORTER.COM (May 27, 2015), https://marylandreporter.com/2015/05/
27/environmentalists-praise-new-clean-water-rules-farmers-upset/.
55. See, e.g., Texas v. EPA, 389 F. Supp. 3d 497 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (challenging the
2015 Rule under the Administrative Procedure Act); id. at 499 n.1 (listing the first three
private party plaintiffs in the suit as the American Farm Bureau Federation, the American
Petroleum Institute, and the American Road and Transportation Builders Association).
56. See, e.g., Colorado v. EPA, 445 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1309–10 (D. Colo. 2020)
(“Several states—including Colorado—successfully sued to enjoin the 2015 Rule.”);
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lawsuits claimed that the Agencies57 failed to follow the guidelines outlined
in the Administrative Procedure Act for promulgating a final rule,58 but the
merits of those claims are beyond the scope of this Comment. Overall,
President Obama’s 2015 Rule steered the regulation of waters of the United
States towards science-based determinations to protect these waters, but at
the cost of complex and time-intensive case-by-case examinations.
B. 2018 Rule – President Trump
Within two months of being sworn in as President of the United States,
President Trump and his administration set a goal to repeal the 2015 Rule.59
The administration’s executive order promulgated a policy that “[i]t is in
the national interest to ensure that the Nation’s navigable waters are kept
free from pollution, while at the same time promoting economic growth,
minimizing regulatory uncertainty, and showing due regard for the roles of
the Congress and the States under the Constitution.”60 The executive order
created a two-step process: (1) repeal the 2015 Rule defining “waters of the
United States” and replace with regulation existing prior to the 2015 Rule;
and (2) publish a new rule that revises the 2015 Rule and all related orders
and regulations to make them consistent with the policy as set forth by the
Executive Order.61 The main goal of Step 1 was to assess which rules
would be followed and to help clarify the confusing regulations that are
applicable in some states but not others. With the enactment of Step 1—and
before the finalization of Step 2—permit applicants had to follow the pre2015 regulations,62 along with addendums that were consistent with
previous Supreme Court decisions and historical EPA practices.63 The final
California v. Wheeler, No. 20-cv-03005-RS, 2020 WL 3403072, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 19,
2020) (“Multiple parties sought judicial review of the 2015 Rule in courts across the
country.”).
57. “Agencies” is used frequently throughout this Comment to describe both the EPA
and the Army Corps of Engineers.
58. See, e.g., Wheeler, 2020 WL 3403072, at *1.
59. Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Feb. 28, 2017).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. In October 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued a nationwide
stay of the 2015 Rule in one of the many lawsuits challenging it. See Ohio v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 803 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2015), vacated, 713 F. App’x 489 (2018)
(dismissing for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to the judgment in Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t
of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617 (2018)).
63. See Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. at 12,497 (instructing the EPA and Army
Corps of Engineers to interpret the CWA term “navigable waters” in a manner “consistent
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action taken under Step 2 was to revise and replace both the pre-2015
regulations and the 2015 Rule.64
Step 1 of this two-step process was finalized in October 2019 and
became effective on December 23, 2019.65 President Trump’s
administration provided four primary reasons for repealing the 2015 Rule.
These justifications included that the 2015 Rule: overstepped the Agencies’
authority under the CWA; failed to consider the policy objective of the
CWA; encroached on the rights of states to regulate pollution and water
resources; and “suffered from certain procedural errors and a lack of
adequate record support.”66
Before the implementation of Step 2, President Trump’s administration
in 2018 issued a rule which created a delay for the pending definitions
previously allowed under President Obama’s administration. This new rule
pushed the effective date of the new definitions to February 6, 2020.67 The
2017 Executive Order also instructed the EPA and Army Corps of
Engineers to interpret “navigable waters”68 to be “consistent with the
opinion of Justice Antonin Scalia in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715
(2006).”69
Step 2, which culminated in 2020 with the promulgation of the
Navigable Waters Protection Rule, created a single set of regulations that
are clear and easy for the Agencies to understand and follow, consistent
with the 2017 Executive Order.70
Although these executive orders and final rules were a major step
forward in the rollback of what the Trump administration and certain

with the opinion of Justice Antonin Scalia in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715
(2006)”).
64. See infra Part V.
65. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules,
84 Fed. Reg. 56,626 (Oct. 22, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts.
110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401).
66. Id.
67. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to
2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5,200, 5,201 (Feb. 6, 2018) (to be codified at 33
C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401).
68. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2018).
69. Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497, 12,497 (Feb. 28, 2017).
70. See Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17.
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grassroots organization perceived as a major “overreach”71 by President
Obama’s 2015 Rule, there were (and are) many pending cases, battling over
what test should apply in determining whether the federal government has
jurisdiction over the permitting of specific waters. Some courts have
implemented Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test,72 while others
remained undecided,73 and yet others followed some combination of the
tests.74 As a result, there is a patchwork of regulatory confusion and
litigation that continues to muddy the WOTUS definition. However,
because the NWPR has now replaced the 2015 Rule, many pending court
cases have been rendered moot.75
IV. CWA and WOTUS Caselaw
Two Supreme Court cases in the early 2000s were highly influential on
the regulation and permitting of navigable waters under the Clean Water
Act.76 However, the arguments made in these two cases over how to define
a navigable water had already been litigated extensively over a decade prior
in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.77 These three cases are
71. Farm Bureau Hails District Court WOTUS Decision, AM. FARM BUREAU FED’N
(June 11, 2018), https://www.fb.org/newsroom/farm-bureau-hails-district-court-wotusdecision.
72. See, e.g., N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999–1000 (9th
Cir. 2007) (“Justice Kennedy’s concurrence [in Rapanos] provides the controlling rule of
law . . . .”); Jones Creek Inv’rs, LLC v. Columbia Cty., 98 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1304 (S.D. Ga.
2015) (“The Eleventh Circuit has adopted Justice Kennedy’s ‘significant nexus’ test as the
governing definition of ‘navigable waters’ under Rapanos.”).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 327 (5th Cir. 2008) (declining to
decide which Rapanos standard controls because “the evidence presented at trial supports
[the jury’s guilty verdict under] all three of the Rapanos standards”).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 182 (3d Cir. 2011) (“We agree
with the conclusion of the First Circuit Court of Appeals that neither the plurality’s test nor
Justice Kennedy’s can be viewed as relying on narrower grounds than the other, and that,
therefore, a strict application of Marks is not a workable framework for determining the
governing standard established in Rapanos. We also agree with its conclusion that each of
the plurality’s test and Justice Kennedy’s test should be used to determine the Corps’
jurisdiction under the CWA.”).
75. See, e.g., Ohio v. EPA, 969 F.3d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 2020) (dismissing an appeal
from the denial of a preliminary injunction of the 2015 Rule on the ground that the Rule’s
repeal and replacement had mooted the controversy).
76. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
77. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
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among the most significant water law cases for arguments about federal
jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. However, the most recent Supreme
Court decision regarding the CWA and permitting occurred in County of
Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund.78
A. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
Tracing WOTUS cases chronologically, Riverside set the stage for the
first showdown between the Agencies and property owners over the
definition of waters of the United States. Here, the Army Corps of
Engineers filed a lawsuit in federal district court to enjoin Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc. (Riverside) from placing fill material on the property
without permission from the Corps.79 The district court initially held that
part of Riverside’s property was a covered wetland and enjoined Riverside
from filling the land with dredged material until it received a permit from
the Corps.80 Through several stages of litigation between the district court
and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,81 along with the changing definition
of “wetlands,” Riverside eventually reached the Supreme Court.82
Using statutory interpretation of the CWA, the Court gave a wideranging reading to the jurisdiction over types of waters the Corps had
authority to regulate.83 The Court held that two aspects of the Clean Water
Act of 1977 confirmed that the Corps had the authority to require permits of
certain discharges of fill material in wetlands.84 The Court based this
conclusion on two findings. First, Congress’s explicit refusal to overrule an
agency’s determination was a sign that its original delineation of authority

78. 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020).
79. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 124.
80. Id. at 125.
81. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 729 F.2d 391, 399 (6th Cir. 1984)
(“We construed the Corps wetlands definition narrowly and concluded that Riverside's
property is not a wetland and that, therefore, the Corps has no jurisdiction over it.”).
82. See 474 U.S. at 125–26.
83. See id. at 139.
84. Id. at 138–39 (“First, in amending § 404 to allow federally approved state permit
programs to supplant regulation by the Corps of certain discharges of fill material, Congress
provided that the States would not be permitted to supersede the Corps’ jurisdiction to
regulate discharges into actually navigable waters and waters subject to the ebb and flow of
the tide, ‘including wetlands adjacent thereto.’ . . . [Second], [t]he enactment of [an
appropriation of $6 million for completing a National Wetlands Inventory] reflects
congressional recognition that wetlands are a concern of the Clean Water Act . . . .”).
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to that agency was “reasonable.”85 Second, those who suggested removing
“wetlands” from the “navigable waters” definition did not think that
elimination of the term was appropriate, but rather that the jurisdiction
given to the Corps was necessary to regulate discharges of pollution.86 This
decision clarified that the Corps and the EPA had broad discretion in
protecting waters.
B. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC)
While the Court in Riverside examined the CWA through a wide lens, it
took a narrower stance sixteen years later in Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) involved a dispute over
filling excavation trenches, which required permitting because the trenches
had become ponds for migratory birds.87 Section 404(a) of the Clean Water
Act requires a permit for the “discharge of dredged or fill materials into the
navigable waters,”88 in which “navigable waters” is further clarified to
mean “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”89 The
Army Corps of Engineers had previously defined the term “waters of the
United States” to contain “waters such as intrastate lake[s], rivers, streams
(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs,
prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use,
degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign
commerce.”90
Eventually, the Army Corps of Engineers declined to grant SWANCC a
section 404(a) permit to fill the excavation trenches because SWANCC
failed to prove that this solution was the least damaging method for disposal
of the waste.91 The district court ruled in favor of SWANCC, but the

85. Id. at 137 (“Although we are chary of attributing significance to Congress’ failure to
act, a refusal by Congress to overrule an agency’s construction of legislation is at least some
evidence of the reasonableness of that construction, particularly where the administrative
construction has been brought to Congress’ attention through legislation specifically
designed to supplant it.”).
86. Id.
87. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159,
163–64 (2001).
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2018).
89. Id. § 1362(7).
90. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1999) (emphasis added).
91. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty., 531 U.S. at 165.
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Seventh Circuit subsequently reversed, holding the CWA “reaches as many
waters as the Commerce Clause allows.”92
The issue before the Court narrowed to whether the Clean Water Act’s
jurisdiction reaches intrastate waters—including excavation trenches which
had recently become homes of migratory birds.93 In writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist declined to extend the reasoning in
Riverside94 to include “isolated ponds” in “§ 404(a)’s definition of
navigable waters because they serve as a habitat for migratory birds.”95 The
Court further held that “[t]he term ‘navigable’ has at least the import of
showing us what Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the
CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been
navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made.”96
SWANCC provided a restriction on the federal government’s control over
waters of the United States. While there may be the opportunity for the
CWA to extend to pollutants that reach directly into federally regulated
waters, other instances are unable to meet the navigable waters threshold.97
As the Court noted, “[w]e cannot agree that Congress’ separate definitional
use of the phrase ‘waters of the United States’ constitutes a basis for
reading the term ‘navigable waters’ out of the statute.”98 This decision
refined and narrowed what authority the government had to regulate waters
under the CWA.
C. Rapanos v. United States
Only a few years later, the Supreme Court heard another CWA
permitting case that questioned the reach of the waters of the United States.
Rapanos v. United States involved an individual who wanted to fill
wetlands on his property to then develop it.99 However, the CWA required
Rapanos to receive a permit to fill these wetlands because they were

92. Id. at 166.
93. See id. at 162.
94. 474 U.S. 121, 134–35 (1985) (noting that adjacent wetlands can serve as habitats for
aquatic species and are “integral parts of the aquatic environment even when the moisture
creating the wetlands does not find its source in the adjacent bodies of water”).
95. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty., 531 U.S. at 171–72 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
96. Id. at 172.
97. Id. at 173–74.
98. Id.
99. 547 U.S. 715, 719–20 (2006) (plurality opinion).
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classified as “waters of the United States.”100 The district court upheld the
Army Corps of Engineers’ determination that Rapanos’s wetlands were
included as “waters of the United States.”101 Later, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed, noting that the “hydrological connection” between the wetlands
and definitive navigable waters confirmed the wetlands as “waters of the
United States.”102
There were two differing opinions written to resolve this case before the
Supreme Court.103 Because neither opinion received a majority of the ninejustice panel, each opinion contained distinct language that failed to clarify
the final extension of waters of the United States. In the end, the Court
vacated and remanded the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ judgment for
further consideration.104
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion received support from Chief Justice
Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito. This opinion noted that “the
phrase ‘the waters of the United States’ includes only those relatively
permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water ‘forming
geographic features’ that are described in ordinary parlance as
‘streams[,] . . . oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.’”105 While this definition does
afford some regulation under the CWA, the above “does not include
channels through which water flows intermittently or ephemerally,” and the
Army Corps of Engineers’ expansion of this rule was not “based on a
permissible construction of the statute.”106 Only waters with a “continuous
surface connection” to waters that are already considered “waters of the
United States” fell under federal jurisdiction.107 Justice Scalia’s analysis
lends to his attitude towards government intervention: less federal oversight
is a good thing.108 Justice Scalia noted the problem in deciding what is
covered as a federally regulated water under the CWA: it is “difficult to

100. Id. at 720–21.
101. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. See Rapanos v. United States, 376 F.3d 629, 640, 648 (6th Cir. 2004).
103. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 753–57.
104. Id. at 757.
105. Id. at 739 (plurality opinion).
106. Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984)).
107. Id. at 742.
108. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of
the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983).
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determine where ‘water[s of the United States]’ end[] and the ‘wetland’
begins.”109
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence reached a different conclusion when he
disposed of the continuous surface connection. Instead, he determined that
wetlands need to have a “significant nexus” to a body of water that
“significantly affect[s] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
covered waters . . . [which are already determined to be] ‘navigable.’”110
However, Justice Kennedy also provided an out: if the “wetlands’ effects on
water quality are speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside the zone
fairly encompassed by the statutory term ‘navigable waters.’”111
The discrepancy between Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia’s opinions
adds even more confusion to a complicated subject,112 but the discussion of
plurality versus plurality is beyond the scope of this Comment. Although
these cases are nearly twenty years old, they are still critical in determining
agency action over WOTUS. President Obama’s administration employed
Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test, while President Trump directed
his agencies to follow Justice Scalia’s opinion.113 The “significant nexus”
test is clearly more encompassing of waters that fall under federal
jurisdiction, while the “continuous surface connection” test requires more
proof to reach that threshold.114
D. County of Maui v. Hawaii Defenders of Wildlife
The Court developed an entirely new test while wrestling with the
question of whether a CWA permit is required when a pollutant that
originates from a point source115 reaches a navigable water through a non109. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742 (plurality opinion).
110. Id. at 767, 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 780.
112. See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (stating that when there
is a plurality opinion with no controlling rationale, “the holding of the Court may be viewed
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))). But see Nichols v.
United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994) (“We think it not useful to pursue the Marks
inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and divided the
lower courts that have considered it.”).
113. See Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497, 12,497 (Feb. 28, 2017).
114. Cf. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 756 (plurality opinion) (explaining that Justice Kennedy’s
test “would [at least] disallow some of the Corps’ excesses”).
115. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2018) (defining a point source as “any discernible, confined,
and discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged”).
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point source, such as groundwater.116 In this case, the County of Maui had a
wastewater reclamation plant that pumped treated water from the plant
hundreds of feet underground.117 Environmental groups then brought suit
against the County of Maui for discharging a pollutant into a “navigable
water” without the necessary CWA permit.118 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the environmental groups because “the
pollutants discharged [without a permit] by the County at the [Lahaina
Wastewater Reclamation Facility] injection wells migrate to the ocean . . .
[and thus] the County is violating the Clean Water Act.”119 The district
court noted that the wells’ discharge into the groundwater was “functionally
one into navigable water[s].”120
While the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court, it also
narrowed the permitting standard. The old standard required that pollutants
be “functionally [discharged] into navigable water,”121 but the new test
required only that pollutants be “fairly traceable from the point source to a
navigable water such that the discharge is the functional equivalent of a
discharge into the navigable water.”122 Because of the differences in
applicable standards for determining when a pollutant is discharged into a
navigable water—e.g., “fairly traceable,”123 having a “direct hydrological
connection,”124 and even excluding discharges through ground water from
the CWA permitting requirements125—the Court granted Maui’s petition for
certiorari.
116. Cty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1468 (2020).
117. Id. at 1469.
118. Id.
119. Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980, 1000 (D. Haw. 2014).
120. Id. at 998.
121. Id.
122. Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2018).
123. Id.
124. Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637, 651 (4th
Cir. 2018) (“[W]e hold that a plaintiff must allege a direct hydrological connection between
ground water and navigable waters in order to state a claim under the CWA for a discharge
of a pollutant that passes through ground water.”), vacated and remanded, 140 S. Ct. 2736
(2020) (mem.); see also National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation
and Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding
Operations, 66 Fed. Reg. 2960, 2964 (proposed Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 122, 412).
125. Ky. Waterways All. v. Ky. Utils. Co., 905 F.3d 925, 932–33 (6th Cir. 2018)
(holding that “the CWA does not extend its reach to this form of pollution,” and thus
disagreeing with the circuit court rulings in Upstate Forever and Haw. Wildlife Fund).
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The County of Maui advocated for a bright line test: “[A] point source
permit is necessary only where pollutants are being delivered to navigable
waters by a point source or series of point sources.”126 Hawaii Wildlife
Fund’s arguments aligned with the decision of the Ninth Circuit, requesting
that “if pollutants are fairly traceable to the point source,” a CWA permit is
necessary.127 The Solicitor General, as amicus curiae, followed a recent
EPA Interpretative Statement128 and asked the Court to confirm that the
CWA reflects “Congress’s intent to leave regulation of releases of
pollutants to groundwater with the states.”129
The Court ultimately rejected all three arguments in favor of its own
interpretation. First, the Court determined that the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of the phrase “from any point source” was too broad.130 Next,
because of a “large and obvious loophole,”131 the Court rejected the County
of Maui and the Solicitor General’s argument that if the pollutant traveled
through any groundwater, the permitting requirement is not necessary. 132
Finally, as neither party nor the Solicitor General asked for Chevron
deference133 on the EPA’s Interpretive Statement, the Court examined the

126. Brief for Petitioner at 27, Cty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462
(2020) (No. 18-260), 2019 WL 2068597, at *27.
127. Brief for Respondents at 13, Cty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462
(2020) (No. 18-260), 2019 WL 3230945, at *13.
128. Interpretive Statement on Application of the Clean Water Act National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System Program to Releases of Pollutants from a Point Source to
Groundwater, 84 Fed. Reg. 16,810, 16,814 (proposed Apr. 23, 2019) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 122) [hereinafter Interpretive Statement] (“The interposition of groundwater
between a point source and the navigable water thus may be said to break the causal chain
between the two, or alternatively may be described as an intervening cause.”).
129. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 19, Cty. of
Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (No. 18-260), 2019 WL 2153160, at *19
(citing Interpretive Statement, 84 Fed. Reg. at 16,814).
130. Cty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1470 (2020).
131. Id. at 1474 (“If that is the correct interpretation of the statute, then why could not the
pipe’s owner, seeking to avoid the permit requirement, simply move the pipe back, perhaps
only a few yards, so that the pollution must travel through at least some groundwater before
reaching the sea?” (citing Brief for State of Maryland et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 9 n.4, Cty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020) (No. 18260), 2019 WL 3336988, at *9 n.4.)).
132. Id.
133. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44
(1984) (“If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
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interpretation in light of agency expertise and practical experience.134
During this examination, the Court concluded that the interpretation argued
for by the County of Maui and the Solicitor General is “neither persuasive
nor reasonable.”135
The Court held that “the statute requires a permit when there is a direct
discharge from a point source into navigable waters or when there is the
functional equivalent of a direct discharge.”136 To determine whether there
is a functional equivalent of a direct discharge, the Court gave a
“nonexhaustive”137 list of seven factors:
(1) transit time, (2) distance traveled, (3) the nature of the
material through which the pollutant travels, (4) the extent to
which the pollutant is diluted or chemically changed as it travels,
(5) the amount of pollutant entering the navigable waters relative
to the amount of the pollutant that leaves the point source, (6) the
manner by or area in which the pollutant enters the navigable
waters, (7) the degree to which the pollution (at that point) has
maintained its specific identity.138
Of these seven factors, the majority noted that “[t]ime and distance will be
the most important factors in most cases,”139 but there are several other
useful methods for courts to apply these factors. The Court acknowledged
that these factors may be difficult to apply in practice, but the arguments
proposed by both parties and the Solicitor General are inconsistent with
congressional intent and the Court’s interpretation of the CWA.140 Because
of the new functional equivalent test, this decision paves the way for further
litigation over the new definitions of waters of the United States as defined
by the Navigable Waters Protection Rule.

regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”).
134. Cty. of Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1475.
135. Id. at 1474.
136. Id. at 1476.
137. Id. at 1481 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1476–77 (majority opinion).
139. Id. at 1477.
140. Id.
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V. Navigable Waters Protection Rule
On January 23, 2020, the EPA announced its newest definition of
“waters of the United States” in the form of the Navigable Waters
Protection Rule (NPWR), codified on April 21.141 This rule provides that
there are now four clearly defined categories for waters of the United
States: “(1) [t]he territorial seas and traditional navigable waters; (2)
perennial and intermittent tributaries that contribute surface water flow to
such waters; (3) certain lakes, ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional
waters; and (4) wetlands adjacent to other jurisdictional waters.”142 This is a
change from the previous 2015 Rule and President Trump’s Step 1
recodification of pre-2015 CWA rules, some of which provided federal
jurisdiction for wetlands that were either adjacent143 and/or neighboring144
to a water that was already jurisdictional under the CWA. The goal of the
NWPR is to set the “boundary between regulated ‘waters of the United
States,’ and the waters subject solely to state and tribal authority.”145 The
following subsections will dissect the new categories of waters of the
United States and those types of waters explicitly excluded.
A. Traditional Navigable Waters (TNWs)
The first category of WOTUS on the NWPR list includes territorial seas
and traditional navigable waters. Section (a)(1) of the NWPR defines this
category to mean: “[t]he territorial seas, and waters which are currently
used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or
foreign commerce, including waters which are subject to the ebb and flow
141. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17; see also EPA Press Office, EPA
and Army Deliver on President Trump’s Promise to Issue the Navigable Waters Protection
Rule – A New Definition of WOTUS, EPA (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/
newsreleases/epa-and-army-deliver-president-trumps-promise-issue-navigable-watersprotection-rule-0.
142. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,251.
143. Clean Water Rule, supra note 13, at 37,058 (defining adjacent waters as “bordering,
contiguous, or neighboring” to “waters of the United States”).
144. Id. (defining “neighboring” further to include “(1) Waters located in whole or in part
within 100 feet of the ordinary high water mark” of a jurisdictional water; “(2) Waters
located in whole or in part in the 100-year floodplain and that are within 1,500 feet of the
ordinary high water mark” of a jurisdictional water; and “(3) Waters located in whole or in
part within 1,500 feet of the high tide line of a traditional navigable water or the territorial
seas and waters located within 1,500 feet of the ordinary high water mark of the Great
Lakes”).
145. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,269.
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of the tide.”146 This new definition does not provide any substantive
changes to the text of previous rules regarding traditional navigable waters
(TNWs); rather, the prior rules are now combined into one paragraph.147
The rationale for combining these definitions into a single paragraph
follows the mindset of commenters, stating that this single paragraph was to
“help[] streamline the regulatory text” as this particular definition of TNWs
is “well understood” by interpreters.148 The Agencies note that there has
been no change in the interpretation of TNWs as it has been understood for
decades.149
Included within this first category of jurisdictional waters alongside
TNWs are territorial seas. “Territorial seas” are defined in the CWA as “the
belt of the seas measured from the line of ordinary low water along that
portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line
marking the seaward limit of inland waters, and extending seaward a
distance of three miles.”150 The text of the NWPR notes that the
streamlining of territorial seas and other waters that “are currently used, or
were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign
commerce”151 was added in order to prevent exclusion of waters that fit the
definition of territorial seas under the CWA.
The tradition of navigable waters has long been cemented in caselaw. In
1870, the Supreme Court in The Daniel Ball stated that waters are
considered “navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of
being used in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce.”152 Over
a century later, the Court further noted that federal jurisdiction of these
navigable waters extends further than The Daniel Ball suggests, indicating
that waters fall under CWA permitting authority when they are “relatively
permanent bodies of water.”153 These navigable-in-fact waters fit the exact
definition of a TNW.

146. Id. at 22,338.
147. Id. at 22,280.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 22,281.
150. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(8) (2018).
151. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,281.
152. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
153. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 734 (2006) (“In addition, the Act’s use of
the traditional phrase ‘navigable waters’ (the defined term) further confirms that it confers
jurisdiction only over relatively permanent bodies of water.”). For a further discussion, see
supra Section IV.C.
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Some commenters expressed concern over whether these waters that are
“susceptible of being used . . . for commerce,” as stated in The Daniel Ball,
could be interpreted liberally to mean any water that has the possibility of
floating a boat.154 However, this idea is quickly dispelled, as it takes “more
than simply being able to float a boat to establish jurisdiction over
navigable-in-fact waters under paragraph (a)(1); it requires evidence of
physical capacity for commercial navigation and that it was, is, or actually
could be used for that purpose.”155
As there is not much change between previous definitions of territorial
seas and this new proposed definition, there is little room for dissenters to
complain. In fact, it appears that consolidating these definitions in a single
paragraph creates a simplified and clearer explanation for traditional
navigable waters.
B. Tributaries
The second category of WOTUS on the NWPR list is tributaries. Section
(a)(2) notes that “tributaries” are jurisdictional waters under the CWA.156 A
tributary is defined as a “river, stream, or similar naturally occurring
surface water channel that contributes surface water flow” to a subsection
(a)(1) water (TNWs) “in a typical year either directly or through one or
more waters identified in paragraph (a)(2), (3), or (4).”157 The Agencies
chose this definition to “establish a clear and easily implementable
definition” that is “consistent with the role of the Federal government under
the Constitution and the CWA.”158 This idea is driven by a precedent
created by the Court that local government should oversee land-use
decisions.159
The definition of tributaries includes many changes from previous rules.
Notably, a water must contribute a flow of surface water during a “typical
154. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,281–82.
155. Id. at 22,282 (citing U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS JURISDICTION DETERMINATION FORM INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDEBOOK app. D (2007),
https://usace.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p16021coll11/id/2316).
156. Id. at 22,338.
157. Id. at 22,339.
158. Id. at 22,287.
159. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531
U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (holding that CWA jurisdiction using the “‘Migratory Bird Rule’
would . . . result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power
over land and water use”); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994)
(“[R]egulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local governments.”).
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year.”160 The term “typical year” is defined to mean a year “when
precipitation and other climatic variables are within the normal periodic
range (e.g., seasonally, annually) for the geographic area of the applicable
aquatic resource based on a rolling thirty-year period.”161 More importantly,
the Agencies also clarify that tributaries are only jurisdictional if they have
a “relatively permanent” surface water contribution.162
Some commenters have expressed concerns that this definition of
“tributary” is unfounded and inconsistent with science, the CWA, and
existing caselaw.163 The EPA’s Science Advisory Board proposed a
Connectivity Report, which stated that “ephemeral, intermittent, and
perennial streams exert a strong influence on the character and function of
downstream waters and that tributary streams are connected to downstream
waters.”164 While the EPA notes that this Connectivity Report was
influential in creating the definition of tributaries, it is not the sole factor
used to create policy.165 This definition—which excludes ephemeral
waters—is consistent with previous decisions by the Court, including both
SWANCC166 and Rapanos.167
Following the same line of thinking, when there is a “break” that
prevents the flow of water from a tributary to a TNW, the upstream
tributary is not considered a WOTUS under the NWPR.168 These instances
of an artificial or natural “break” split waters of jurisdiction. These breaks
prevent jurisdiction under the CWA, as this water would not contribute to
160. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,274.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 22,273–74.
163. Id. at 22,288.
164. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Letter from David T. Allen, Chair, Sci.
Advisory Bd., & Amanda D. Rodewald, Chair, SAB Panel for the Review of the EPA Water
Body Connectivity Rep., to Gina McCarthy, Adm’r, EPA (Oct. 17, 2014) at 3).
165. Id. at 22,261 (“[S]cience cannot dictate where to draw the line between Federal and
State waters, as this is a legal question that must be answered based on the overall
framework and construct of the CWA.”).
166. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159,
168 n.3 (2001) (explaining that while the Conference Report discussing the term “navigable
waters” noted the term should “be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation,”
nothing in the report indicated that “Congress intended to exert anything more than its
commerce power over navigation”).
167. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 733 (2006) (stating that waters of the
United States should “include only relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of
water”).
168. See Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,276–77.
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the surface water flow necessary to establish flow on a perennial or
intermittent basis.169 This new rule has caused apprehension as some public
comments demonstrate a fear that excluding waters upstream from breaks
would prevent jurisdiction for waters that would typically be considered
TNWs, but are now excluded due to the break.170 However, the Agencies
provide that “channelized non-jurisdictional surface water features do not
sever jurisdiction of upstream perennial or intermittent waters so long as
they convey surface water from such upstream waters to downstream
jurisdictional waters in a typical year.”171 “Channelized” is further defined
to mean water flows with a “defined path or course” and that these flows
are restricted to their defined path or course.172
Finally, in cases where there are features that disturb the surface water
flow (such as dams, boulder fields, or gravel pits) but do not sever the
surface flow, the Agencies have determined that these waters are still
considered jurisdictional if they meet the other requirements of the CWA.173
However, if these features themselves do not meet the definition of a
tributary from (a)(2) of the NWPR, they are not jurisdictional, regardless of
whether these features convey a surface water flow.174
Some of the biggest shifts in defining WOTUS fall under the tributary
section of the NWPR. Further analysis of ditches and how they fit into this
equation are discussed below.175 While the overall theme of the NWPR is to
offer greater clarity when it comes to defining WOTUS, there are still
instances when a case-by-case analysis of individual waters would be the
best test to determine federal jurisdiction.
C. Lakes and Ponds, and Impoundments of Jurisdictional Waters
The third category of WOTUS on the NWPR list includes lakes and
ponds and impoundments of jurisdictional waters. Section (a)(3) defines
lakes, ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional waters to be “waters of
the United States.”176 Specifically, a lake, pond, or impoundment is a
jurisdictional water under three rules: (1) it is considered a territorial sea or
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 22,289.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra Section VI.A.
Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,300.
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TNW as defined under section (a)(1); (2) it “contributes surface water flow
to the territorial seas or a traditional navigable water in a typical year either
directly or through one or more jurisdictional waters;” or (3) it “is
inundated by flooding from a paragraph (a)(1) through (3) water in a typical
year.”177 Further, if a lake, pond, or impoundment is considered a
jurisdictional water, it does not lose this status if the surface water flow
reaches an already-regulated water in a typical year “through a channelized
non-jurisdictional surface water feature.”178 Examples of these channelized,
non-jurisdictional surface water features include both artificial features,
such as culverts, dikes, or spillways, and natural features, like boulder
fields.179
Separating lakes, ponds, and impoundments from adjacent waters is a
departure from the 2015 Rule. The 2015 Rule included all lakes and ponds
within 1,500 feet of a tributary, and other, qualified, lakes and ponds that
could be up to 4,000 feet from a jurisdictional water.180 The key distinction
between the two rules is highlighted by the NWPR’s regulation of waters
that drain downstream into an already jurisdictional water, regardless of the
distance between the two bodies of water. However, a lake, pond, or
impoundment is considered a WOTUS only if the water flows from a
jurisdictional water to the pond, lake, or impoundment.181
Overall, while there is some change in how the NWPR affects lakes,
ponds, and impoundments, these changes are familiar as they follow both
legal and administrative precedents,182 albeit in a slightly narrower view.
Now these types of water are combined into a single definition, with lakes,
ponds, and impoundments qualifying as jurisdictional if, in a typical year,
they drain to a jurisdictional water.183

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Clean Water Rule, supra note 13, at 37,058–059.
181. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,251. This flow of water
from the jurisdictional water to the lake, pond, or impoundment makes that feature a part of
the jurisdictional water, thereby making it jurisdictional as well. Id.
182. Id. Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Rapanos stated that the term “the waters” is
most commonly understood to refer to “‘streams and bodies forming geographical features
such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,’ or ‘the flowing or moving masses, as of waves or floods,
making up such streams or bodies.’” 547 U.S. at 732 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2882 (2d ed. 1954)).
183. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,251.
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D. Adjacent Wetlands
The fourth category of WOTUS on the NWPR list is adjacent wetlands.
Section (a)(4) defines the last section of waters to be considered WOTUS
under the NWPR: adjacent wetlands.184 In a pattern beginning to feel
familiar to readers, there are several specific factors that an adjacent
wetland must meet in order to be a jurisdictional water. To be jurisdictional,
the adjacent wetland must meet one or more of the following: (1) abut a
territorial sea, TNW, tributary, or jurisdictional lake, pond, or
impoundment; (2) in a typical year, be flooded by a territorial sea, TNW,
tributary, or jurisdictional lake, pond, or impoundment; (3) be physically
separated from a territorial sea, TNW, tributary, or jurisdictional lake, pond,
or impoundment by a natural feature; or (4) be separated from a territorial
sea, TNW, tributary, or jurisdictional lake, pond, or impoundment by an
artificial feature, but only if the feature allows for a “direct hydrologic
surface connection” between this adjacent wetland and the territorial sea,
TNW, tributary, or jurisdictional lake, pond, or impoundment in a typical
year.185 For example, a wetland will be considered a jurisdictional water if it
is divided by a “berm, bank, dune, or other similar feature” or an artificial
feature, such as a road or a culvert, as long as there is a “direct hydrological
connection through or over that structure in a typical year.”186
Just as with the lakes, ponds, and impoundments, the departure from the
previous rule involves changing from a specific distance to a jurisdictional
water requirement.187 As a result, regulated wetlands are: directly abutted or
flooded by a jurisdictional water; separated from jurisdictional waters by
natural features; or separated from jurisdictional waters by artificial features
that allow water to pass through.188 Another textual change is that the
NWPR eliminates the “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring” language
from the 2015 Rule,189 while using the familiar “adjacent” term, in an effort
to “reduce the potential confusion associated with using [these] three
seemingly similar terms in the same definition.”190

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 22,338.
Id. at 22,251.
Id.
Clean Water Rule, supra note 13, at 37,059.
Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,312–13.
Clean Water Rule, supra note 13, at 30,755.
Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,307.
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E. Non-WOTUS Waters
Section (b) of the rule sets forth twelve exclusions from WOTUS under
the CWA.191 Many of the waters explicitly excluded are consistent with
previous interpretations.192 Foremost, any body of water that does not
explicitly fit the definitions from paragraphs (a)(1)–(4) is not regulated by
the CWA.193 Some of these excluded waters include groundwater,
“irrigation ditches” and “irrigation canals” which have “irrigation returns
flows” and are constructed upland.194 Upland195 is further defined to mean
“any land area that under normal circumstances does not satisfy all three
wetland factors (i.e., hydrology, hydrophytic vegetation, hydric soils)
identified in paragraph (c)(16) of this section, and does not lie below the
ordinary high water mark or the high tide line of a jurisdictional water.”196
The goal of the excluded waters in section (b) of the NWPR is to follow
long-standing practice while eliminating confusion over which waters are
regulated by the CWA and which waters are not.197
VI. Impact of the Navigable Waters Protection Rule on Agriculture
Agriculture industry leaders198 praised the adoption of the NWPR as it
provides greater clarity in determining which waters fall under federal
jurisdiction and which waters are regulated on the local level.199 Prior to the
introduction of the NWPR, many notable complaints from agriculturists
were that the federal government was overreaching its bounds to regulate
191. Id. at 22,278.
192. See id. at 22,317 (“Two of the exclusions (waste treatment systems and prior
converted cropland) have been expressly included in the regulatory text for decades.”).
193. Id. at 22,338 (emphasis added).
194. Id. at 22,261.
195. See infra Section VI.B (further discussing the term “upland”).
196. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,339.
197. Id. at 22,317–18.
198. Agricultural industry leaders who praised the NWPR include Zippy Duval,
President of the American Farm Bureau Federation; Roger Johnson, President of the
National Farmers Union; Ben Scholz, President of the National Association of Wheat
Growers; Bill Gordon, President of the American Soybean Association; Jennifer Houston,
President of the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association; David Herring, President of the
National Pork Producers Council; and Barbara Glenn, CEO of the National Association of
State Departments of Agriculture.
199. Carol Ryan Dumas, Agriculture Applauds New WOTUS Rule, CAP. PRESS (Jan. 23,
2020),
https://www.capitalpress.com/nation_world/agriculture-applauds-new-wotus-rule/
article_408287cc-3e32-11ea-ab4b-8ba892778b6f.html.
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waters where it has no authority to regulate.200 Even the Supreme Court
notes that determining where “water ends and land begins . . . is often no
easy task.”201
As the NWPR relates to agriculture, the major changes from the previous
rules to this current rule focus on categories (a)(2) (tributaries) and (a)(4)
(adjacent wetlands). Both areas are essential to agriculture as they are
commonly found on an individual landowner’s property. As Justice Scalia
noted, “[C]lean water is not the only purpose of the [Clean Water Act]. So
is the preservation of primary state responsibility for ordinary land-use
decisions.”202 The Agencies wanted to ensure that “States and Tribes retain
authority over their land and water resources.”203
A. Tributaries
Tributaries are only jurisdictional waters if their surface contribution
flows at a perennial or intermittent rate, and this flow contribution arrives at
a TNW in a typical year.204 This distinction is key because it changes the
regulation of waters that have an ephemeral flow. Ephemeral flows occur
“only in direct response to precipitation.”205 Because intermittent206 and
perennial207 water flows require continuous flow, ephemeral waters fail to
meet this standard.
This definition of tributary replaces Justice Kennedy’s “significant
nexus” test, which analyzed waters on a case-by-case basis.208 The
Agencies think this new definition will provide greater clarity across the
board.209 Implementation of the new definition for tributaries will require
the identification of distinct features to determine whether a tributary
200. Id.
201. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985).
202. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 755–56 (2006) (citing 33 U.S.C. §
1251(b)).
203. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,269.
204. Id. at 22,287.
205. Id. at 22,338.
206. Id. at 22,338 (“The term intermittent means surface water flowing continuously
during certain times of the year and more than in direct response to precipitation . . . .”).
207. Id. at 22,339 (“The term perennial means surface water flowing continuously yearround.”).
208. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 779 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“Jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the existence of a significant nexus between the
wetland in question and navigable waters in the traditional sense.”).
209. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,270–71.
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exists.210 However, identification will be an easier process than “multifactored case-specific significant nexus analysis.”211
Ditches, while not on the list of WOTUS—and thereby exempted unless
they have other qualifications—are nearly exclusively exempt from federal
jurisdiction under the CWA.212 The Agencies, noting that determining
whether ditches are federally jurisdictional has been a great source of
confusion for agriculturalists,213 proposed three categories of ditches which
are jurisdictional waters, and the rest were exempt:
(1) [d]itches that are traditional navigable waters or that are
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide (e.g., paragraph (a)(1)
waters); (2) ditches that are constructed in tributaries or that
relocate or alter tributaries as long as the ditch satisfies the flow
conditions of the tributary definition; and (3) ditches constructed
in adjacent wetlands as long as the ditch likewise satisfies the
conditions of the tributary definition.214
The NWPR, however, decided against creating a free-standing category
for ditches and blended the Agencies’ proposal into the “tributary”
category.215 The goal of this new rule is to alleviate the confusion and
provide greater clarity, as the regulation of all other types of ditches is best
left to the states and tribes.216
Specific to agriculture and irrigation ditches, Congress has already
granted an exemption to the construction or maintenance of these ditches if
they are associated with normal farming activities.217 There is little
legislative history that precisely identifies Congress’s exact reasoning for
210. See id. at 22,270 (“[T]he agencies acknowledge that field work may frequently be
necessary to verify whether a feature is a water of the United States.”).
211. Id. at 22,270–71 (“The application of a clear test for categorically covered and
excluded waters, as presented in this final rule, is inherently less complicated than a complex
multi-factored significant nexus test that must be applied on a case-by-case basis to
countless waters and wetlands across the nation.”).
212. Id. at 22,251–52.
213. See id. at 22,295.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 22,295–96 (noting that States and Tribes retain regulatory power over “all
other ditches . . . as part of their primary authority over land and water resources within their
borders” (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(b), 1370)).
217. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A), (C) (2018) (exempting activities of normal farming and
ranching, the construction of farm or stock ponds, and the construction and maintenance of
drainage ditches from sections 301, 402, and 404 of the CWA).
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these exemptions.218 Nevertheless, ditches could still be subject to
regulation even if they do not meet the definition of a tributary. If a ditch is
classified as a point source,219 it could still be subject to CWA permitting
under the NWPR rule.220 The bottom line regarding ditches is that they are
excluded unless they are already considered a jurisdictional water or meet
the definition of a point source. However, the burden of proof for
determining whether a ditch is a jurisdictional water under the definition of
a tributary falls to the Agencies.221
B. Adjacent Wetlands
As discussed above, there are four specific ways for a wetland to be
considered a jurisdictional water.222 However, land that does meet all three
of the wetland factors from the Army Corps of Engineer’s Wetlands
Delineation Manual223 or as defined by the Agencies224 is to be considered
“upland” and not a jurisdictional water. Uplands could be previous
wetlands that have been converted by natural transformation or lawful
conversion.225 Adjacent wetlands, under the NWPR, are narrowed to

218. See Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,296 (“One possible
interpretation of these exemptions is that they function as an implicit acknowledgement that
there may be some irrigation or drainage ditches that are waters of the United States, thus the
need to exempt common agricultural and related practices in those waters from CWA
section 404 permitting.”).
219. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (defining a point source as “any discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged”).
220. See Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,297 (“Either it is a water
of the United States that subjects a discharger to sections 402 and 404 permitting
requirements for direct discharges into the ditch, or, if it is non-jurisdictional but conveys
pollutants to downstream jurisdictional waters, it may be a point source that subjects a
discharger into a ditch to section 402 permitting requirements.”).
221. DEP’T OF THE ARMY & ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NAVIGABLE WATERS PROTECTION
RULE: RURAL AMERICA AND THE NAVIGABLE WATERS PROTECTION RULE 2 (2020)
[hereinafter RURAL AMERICA AND THE NWPR] (fact sheet) (“Absent such evidence, the
agencies will determine the ditch is non-jurisdictional.”).
222. See supra Part V.
223. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, CORPS OF ENGINEERS WETLANDS DELINEATION
MANUAL 9–10 (Jan. 1987) (“Wetlands have the following general diagnostic environmental
characteristics: (1) Vegetation . . . (2) Soil . . . [and] (3) Hydrology.”).
224. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,308 (including factors for
defining a wetland, “i.e., hydrology, hydrophytic vegetation, and hydric soils”).
225. Id.
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wetlands, rather than “all waters” adjacent to CWA-jurisdictional waters as
prescribed under the 2015 Rule.226
C. Non-Jurisdictional Waters
Further excluded waters are all groundwaters, ephemeral features, and
prior converted cropland. The NWPR offers clarification for each of these
categories. Groundwaters exempted include all “groundwater drained
through subsurface drainage systems.”227 This groundwater exemption is
crucial to agriculture because it excludes drainage systems, such as tile
drains, from agricultural land.228 Ephemeral features are discussed above,229
but include almost any type of waterbody created by precipitation.230 These
are particularly vital for agriculture as these features are common among
landowners. Prior converted cropland includes any land, before December
23, 1985, which was converted to make the “production of an agricultural
product possible.”231
Prior converted cropland can only be considered a jurisdictional water
under the CWA if the “area is abandoned and has reverted to [a
jurisdictional] wetland[].”232 Abandonment occurs when the “prior
converted cropland is not used for, or in support of, agricultural purposes at
least once in the immediately preceding five years.”233 A crucial distinction
is that cropland that is undisturbed for any conservation or agricultural
purpose is still considered an agricultural use, and the exemption will still
apply to these lands.234
Finally, any artificial lake or pond that is constructed in upland or nonjurisdictional waters is not considered a WOTUS under the CWA.235 Even
if these waters have a surface water connection to a downstream

226. Clean Water Rule, supra note 13, at 30,758–59.
227. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,251.
228. RURAL AMERICA AND THE NWPR, supra note 221, at 3.
229. See supra Section VI.A.
230. Navigable Waters Protection Rule, supra note 17, at 22,317 (excluding “ephemeral
features, including ephemeral streams, swales, gullies, rills, and pools”).
231. Id. at 22,339.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. RURAL AMERICA AND THE NWPR, supra note 221, at 2–3.
235. Id. at 3.
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jurisdictional water, these upland waters are excluded.236 Uses of this water
can be for irrigation or creating stock or farm ponds.237
These new changes created by the NWPR will have a positive impact on
agriculturalists. The new categories under the NWPR establish an
application process that is streamlined based on existing definitions from
previous precedent and tailored to the powers delineated to the Agencies by
Congress. Because the NWPR proposes easy-to-apply rules to determine
the jurisdictional status of a water, landowners are spared excess costs and
time that was previously lost in the confusing and complex permitting
process from earlier regulation. The NWPR should stop the shifting
definition of waters of United States, at least for now.
VII. Litigation over the Navigable Waters Protection Rule
In the Supreme Court’s most recent WOTUS decision—County of
Maui238—none of the opinions addressed the Navigable Waters Protection
Rule (NWPR) in detail. The facts in County of Maui did not support any
argument that the Pacific Ocean was not clearly a navigable water subject
to CWA requirements.239 However, if future NWPR litigation calls into
question whether a water is considered a WOTUS under the NWPR,
County of Maui will be heavily involved in both arguments and determining
the outcome. Many different groups, from states to industry groups, are
attacking the NWPR. Some claim that the NWPR is a vast overreach by the
federal government,240 while others say it is woefully inadequate in
protecting our nation’s waters.241 Both of these arguments are analyzed
below.
A. NWPR Is Overreach by Federal Government
Several ranchers in western states claim this new WOTUS rule is a
violation of the Constitution, the Clean Water Act, and Supreme Court
precedent.242 Further, New Mexico Cattle Grower’s Association argues that
the NWPR is an “illegal interpretation” by the Army Corps of Engineers
236. Id.
237. See id.
238. Cty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020).
239. See id. at 1469 (describing the Pacific Ocean as a navigable water).
240. See infra Section VII.A.
241. See infra Section VII.B.
242. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 19–20, Or. Cattlemen’s Ass’n v.
Wheeler, No. 3:19-cv-00564-AC (D. Or. filed Apr. 16, 2019).
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and the EPA because these interpretations are arbitrary and capricious, ultra
vires, and violate the Administrative Procedure Act.243 These groups attack
several of the specific definitions of TNWs because of lack of conformity
with Supreme Court precedent and previous interpretation by the Army
Corps of Engineers and the EPA.244 For example, intermittent tributaries
could now be considered navigable waters because there is no minimum
amount of water flow or duration of water flow for the body of water to be
considered a tributary.245
These farmers and ranchers argue that the NWPR places an undue
burden on them to operate their land by requiring costly permit approval
under the CWA.246 These costs can be amplified because the CWA is
unique in that “most laws do not require the hiring of expert consultants to
determine if [the law] appl[ies] to you or your property.”247 Both the New
Mexico Cattle Grower’s and Oregon Cattlemen’s Association’s lawsuits
request declaratory and injunctive relief that invalidates the NWPR.248
B. NWPR Ignores Science and Precedent
Several state attorneys general and environmental groups have also filed
lawsuits against the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers, but they are
arguing the other side of the spectrum from what the landowners and
ranchers argued in their lawsuit: that the NWPR does not do enough to
protect waters of the United States.249 These groups have argued that the
NWPR “expressly” ignores the purpose of the CWA and “hampers the
objective to restore and maintain our Nation’s waters.”250 Despite the

243. First Supplemental Complaint at 14, 18, N.M. Cattle Grower’s Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, No. 1:19-cv-00988-JHR-SCY (D.N.M. filed Apr. 27, 2020).
244. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 242, at 18, 25.
245. First Supplemental Complaint, supra note 243, at 30.
246. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 242, at 18; First
Supplemental Complaint, supra note 243, at 15.
247. Hawkes Co., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 944, 1003 (8th Cir. 2015)
(Kelly, J., concurring), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016).
248. First Supplemental Complaint, supra note 243, at 44–47; Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief, supra note 242, at 26–27.
249. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 24,
Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 1:20-cv-01064-GLR (D. Md. filed Apr.
27, 2020).
250. Id.
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different arguments being made, the request for relief is the same: vacate
and set aside the NWPR.251
VIII. Conclusion
Overall, the area of permitting will continue to provide litigation and
administrative dispute for some time, especially as the Navigable Waters
Protection Rule is published in the Federal Register. While the intent to
create new, easier-to-understand, and less powerful regulations for the
federal control of waters is an admirable one, environmental rights groups
and others will argue that this deregulation will have adverse effects on
water quality.252 The merits of their arguments are (again) beyond the scope
of this Comment, but they raise what I believe to be a moot point: the
deregulation is a bit of a misnomer. The deregulation does not completely
gut any provision to protect the “waters of the United States.” If the federal
government is unable to regulate these waters, there are still state
regulations which protect the environment.253 However, the protection of
our waters is still an important endeavor and one that will continue to grow
in importance. Indeed, “among these treasures of our land is water fast
becoming our most valuable, most prized, most critical resource.”254
Hammons P. Hepner

251. Id. at 37; see also Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 24, State et al.
v. Wheeler, No. 3:20-cv-03005 (N.D. Cal. filed May 5, 2020).
252. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 251, at 16.
253. See, e.g., 60 OKLA. STAT. § 60 (2011) (noting that public water is “for the benefit
and welfare of the people of the state” and is subject to state appropriation and pollution
laws).
254. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address at the Dedication of McNary Dam, Walla
Walla, Washington (Sept. 23, 1954), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/232715.
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